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VOTING AND ELECTION LAW
IN THE LOUISIANA CONSTITUTION
Introduction
Prior to the adoption of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, voting
and election laws were a confusing combination of constitutional and
statutory provisions. In an effort to concisely define voting rights and
regulations, the Louisiana Constitutional Convention divided into two
sections the issues associated with voting:' article I, section 102 announces
the right of citizens to vote; article XI3 groups together the remaining
issues associated with voting.
Part I of this article explores the history and development of article
I, section 10 of the 1974 Louisiana Constitution, along with current
legal issues surrounding the area of the voting rights. Part II presents
an outline of the judicial treatment given article XI and the effect of
that jurisprudence on current legal development.
I.

THE RIGHT TO VOTE

States have broad powers in regulating an individual's right to vote
in state elections." Federal election procedure is also a matter of state
law, since the federal government has chosen not to regulate the process. 5
Consequently, both state and federal election procedure is subject to
federal scrutiny only to the extent that state voting qualifications and
electoral practices by state officials contravene the provisions of the
6
United States Constitution
The United States Supreme Court has ruled that "where fundamental
rights and liberties are asserted under the Equal Protection Clause,
classifications which might invade or restrain them must be closely
scrutinized and carefully confined,"' and "if a challenged state statute
grants the right to vote to some ...

and denies the franchise to others,

Copyright 1986, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW,

1. See Proceedings, Sept, 8, at 1203-10,
2. La. Const. art. 1, § 10.
3. La. Const. art, XI,
4. Lassiter v. Northhampton County Bd, (f Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 79 S. Ct, 985
(1959).
5. Roudebush v. Harth, 405 U.S, 15, 92 S. Ct. 804 (1972).
6. United States v. Louisiana, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La. 1963).
7. Harper v. Virginia State Bd, of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 670, 86 S. Cl, 1079,
1083 (1966).
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the Court must determine whether the exclusions are necessary to promote a compelling state interest."" Hence, any qualification Louisiana
places on voting must first be tested under state statutory and constitutional law, then under the Equal Protection Clause of the federal
Constitution and the Voting Rights Act. 9
In 1974, after Louisiana adopted its new constitution, residency
requirements, character, and literacy tests were no longer constitutionally
imposed qualifications on the right to vote.' 0 Article 1, section 10 provides
that every citizen, upon reaching the age of eighteen, has a right to
register to vote. The only circumstances under which this tight can be
denied are "while a person is interdicted and judicially declared mentally
incompetent or is under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a
felony.""
Originally, section 10 was intended to be a self-operative restriction
on voting for those imprisoned or interdicted. 2 In Fox v. Municipal
Democrat Executive Committee, 3 however, the second circuit held that,
unless the right to vote was specifically suspended by legislative means,
it was not automatically forfeited. The legislature reacted to this decision
by passing legislation 4 which expressly denies the right to vote to persons
under an order of imprisonment for conviction of a felony and to
persons interdicted and judicially declared mentally incompetent."
Because article I, section 10 establishes a right to register as well
as to vote, it is implicit that the State has the power to make registration
a prerequisite to voting.' 6 Article XI, section 1, provides: "The legislature
shall adopt an election code which shall provide for permanent regis-

8. Kramer v. Union Free School District, 395 U.S. 621, 627, 89 S. Ct. 1886, 1890
(1969).
9. 42 U.S.C. § 1971 (1965) et. seq.
10. Hargrave, The Declaration of Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35
La. L. Rev. I, 32 (1974).
I. La. Const. art. 1,§ 10.
12. See Proceedings, Sept. 8, at 1203.
13. 328 So. 2d 171 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1976).
14. 1976 La. Acts No. 697 § 102, codified in La. R.S. 18:102 (1979).
15. The procedure for denying the right to vote is established in La. R.S. 18:171,
172 and 176. (1979 & Supp. 11986). La. R.S. 18:171 (1979) provides that "the clerk ..
shall record ... each order of imprisonment ... [and) shall transmit to the registrar
of voters for his parish a certified copy of the judgment." La. R.S. 18:172 (1979) pertains
to interdiction and provides that "the clerk ... shall record ... each judgment of
interdiction for mental incompetence . .. [and] shall transmit to the registrar of voters
for his parish a certified copy of the judgment." La. R.S. 18:176 (Supp. 1986) provides
for cancellation of voting rights based on La. R.S. 18:171 and 172: "Immediately upon
receipt of a report required by Sections 171 or [172] of this Chapter, the registrar shall
cancel the registration of each person listed.

16. Hargrave, supra note: 10.
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tration of voters and for the conduct of elections."' 7 Louisiana Revised
Statute 18:52118 requires that all voters be registered before the right to
vote may be exercised.
The only constitutionally authorized qualifications to vote in Louisiana are those expressed in article I, section 10 and implemented by
Louisiana Revised Statute 18:102,19 and the registration requirement set
forth in Louisiana Revised Statute 18:521.
Order of Imprisonment
There has long been debate as to the exact meaning of "order of
imprisonment" within article I, section 10. The wording originally proposed was "imprisoned. ' 20 It was expanded to "order of imprisonment"
to overcome the objection that escapees would not fall within the "imprisoned" terminology. 2' Upon presentation to the Constitutional Convention, one delegate (a member of the committee that proposed the
language) reported that "order of imprisonment" extended not only to
persons imprisoned, but also to persons whose sentences had been suspended and to persons who were on parole.22 A second delegate claimed
the definition as proposed would not include parolees and those under
suspended sentences, because the language of article I, section 10 was
inconsistent with other language (current article I, section 20) in the
proposed constitution. 23 This difference in interpretation can be traced
to the Constitution of 1921, wherein the rights of citizenship, including
the right to vote, were not automatically restored after a felon completed
supervision following a felony conviction, but only upon pardon by the
governor. 24 In an attempt to provide for automatic restoration of rights,
the Convention adopted current article I, section 20, which provides
that all rights of citizenship are automatically restored upon completion
of "supervision following conviction." The Convention clearly established that those persons serving a suspended sentence and those on
parole did not have their rights restored until completion of their supervision.
At the same time that the Convention adopted the language of
Article 1, section 20 which provided for greater rights than did the 1921
Constitution, the Convention also sought to provide greater voting rights

17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.

La. Const. art. XI, § I.
La. R.S. 18:521 (Supp. 1986).
La. R.S. 18:102 (Supp. 1986).
See Proceedings, Sept. 8.
Hargrave, supra note 10, at 34.
Proceedings, Sept. 8, at 1203.
Proceedings, Sept. 8, at 1204.
Proceedings, Sept. 8, at 1201.
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for all citizens. The proposed language of article I, section 10 was designed
to provide an absolute right to vote for all citizens with only two limited
qualifications-persons deemed mentally incapable of voting and persons
who were imprisoned. The Convention then adopted the "order of
imprisonment" language within section 10.2 Had the Convention sought
to deny the right to vote to persons supervised during a suspended
sentence, it could have chosen the wording of article I, section 20, i.e.,
"supervision following conviction." Instead, "order of imprisonment"
was chosen, thus producing two phrases which seem to create different
results. At least one commentator has concluded that article I, section
10 applies to only those in prison and not to those on parole or probation. 2
In 1975, the Attorney General issued an opinion declaring that
"order of imprisonment" includes persons on parole but not persons
on probation. 27 His conclusion was based on the language of article I,
section 20, and not on the history of section 10. Professor Lee Hargrave,
a noted authority, questioned the grounds for this decision and restated
his view that "order of imprisonment" extended only to persons in
prison. 28 Louisiana Revised Statutes 15:574.729 and 15:574.9,30 which
outline the procedures for revocation of parole, support this interpretation. These statutes provide that a parolee must be arrested 3' and given
a hearing before he can be reimprisoned.1 2 Under the statutory scheme
a parolee is not imprisoned or under an "order of imprisonment" until
this procedure has been followed.
Nevertheless, in 1976 the legislature enacted the Louisiana Election
Code," and included a definition of "order of imprisonment" that
parallels the Attorney General's definition.3 4 This definition included
those people who had been paroled and those whose sentences had been

25. See Proceedings, Sept. 8.
26. Hargrave, Louisiana Constitutional Law, 37 La. L. Rev. 480, 491 (1977).
27. La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-131 (May 2, 1975).
28. Hargrave, supra note 26.
29. La. R.S, 15:574.7 (1981).
30. La. R.S. 15:574.9 (1981 & Supp. 1986).
31. La. R.S. 15:574.7(B)(3) (1981) provides that "the parolee be arrested, and upon
arrest be given a prerevocation hearing .... Upon receiving a summary of the prerevocation
proceeding, the board may order the parolee's return to the institution." (emphasis added).
32. La. R.S. 15:574.9 (1981) addresses "revocation of parole for violation of condition;
hearing; duration of reimprisonment and reparole after revocation; credit for time served."
La. R.S. 15:574.7 sets up the procedure for the parolee to be reimprisoned after his
arrest.
33. 1976 La. Acts No. 697 § i.
34. 1976 La. Acts No. 697 § 2.
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suspended.35 In 1977, an amendment expanded the "order of imprisonment" definition to include those persons "on probation. 3 6 This
definition is contrary to the Attorney General's opinion, the language
of article I, section 20, and the definition originally intended.
It is "universally regarded"" that once the right to vote has been
granted by a state constitution, it may not be denied, abridged, or
substantially impaired by the state legislature. 8 Louisiana's state constitution limits the legislature's power to alter constitutional provisions.3 9
The legislature can only deny the right to vote to those groups explicitly
covered by article I, section 10. Therefore, the legislature's current
definition is valid only if it was originally authorized by the constitution
or approved by a constitutional amendment.
State courts outside of Louisiana which have interpreted voting
statutes have found that "the right to vote should not be taken away
due to doubtful statutory construction.' 40 The general trend is to construe election statutes in favor of enfranchisement.4 1 In Louisiana the
definition most favorably supporting enfranchisement is the one which
is the most limited-i.e., "order of imprisonment" refers only to those
actually imprisoned. The legislature's expanded definition is therefore
void as a substantial impairment to the right to vote beyond that
42
authorized by the Louisiana Constitution.
While it is the court's duty to uphold the constitutionality of a
statute whenever possible unless it is clearly arbitrary, unreasonable, and
capricious, 43 statutes involved with fundamental rights are to be strictly
scrutinized. 44 Given the importance of the right to vote, and that the
original language of article I, section 10 was "imprisoned", any doubts
as to the meaning should be construed to favor the right to vote. A
constitutional amendment is the only valid means available to the leg-

35. As originally worded La. R.S. 18:2(2) read: " 'Under an order of imprisonment'
means a sentence of confinement, whether or not suspended, with or without supervision,
and whether or not the subject of the order has been paroled."
36. 1977 La. Acts No. 544 § 1, codified in La. R.S. 18:2 (1981), now provides:
'Under an order of imprisonment' means a sentence of confinement, whether or not
suspended, whether or not the subject of the order has been placed on probation, with
or without supervision, and whether or not the subject of the order has been paroled."
37. Wilkinson v. Queen, 269 S.W.2d 223 (Ky. 1954).
38. See, e.g., Melvin v. Sweeney, 154 Ohio 223, 94 N.E.2d 785 (1958). See also 29
C.J.S. Elections § 7(l) (1955).
39. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975).
40. See, e.g., Cirac v. Lander County, 602 P.2d 1012 (Nev. 1979).
41. Id. See also 29.C.J.S. Elections § 7(1) (1955).
42. State ex rel. Palag v. Regan, 113 Mont. 343, 126 P.2d 818 (1942).
43. State v. Rones, 223 La. 839, 67 So. 2d 99 (1953).
44. Regira v. Falsetta, 405 So. 2d 850 (La. App. IstCir. 1981).
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islature to accomplish what it has attempted to accomplish by
45
statutes.
Article I, section 10 must also be consistent with federal constitutional requirements. In Richardson v. Ramirez, 6 the United States Supreme Court found that a state could deny the right to vote to convicted
felons who had completed their sentences and paroles.47 This restriction
was found not to violate the Equal Protection Clause or any other
provision of the federal Constitution." Thus, Louisiana's voting restriction found in article I, section 10 is clearly within Richardson's constitutional bounds.
Interdicted and Judicially Declared Mentally Incompetent
Every state, either through its constitution or legislation, denies the
right to vote to mental incompetents.4 9 Many states have been challenged
to precisely define terms such as "lunatic," "insane," and "under
guardianship." 50 Louisiana attempted to avoid this problem by formulating clear and concise language without denying the right to vote to
qualified persons." Denial of voting rights based solely on commitment
to a mental institution was considered too drastic a measure, as the
procedure for commitment was too simple.5 2 (Commitment can be accomplished voluntarily, or involuntarily for reasons such as alcohol and
drug abuse.) Because a person can be interdicted for reasons other than
mental incompetence, interdiction as the sole basis for exclusion would
have denied the right to vote to those who were competent to exercise
that right." The committee settled for a formula in article I, section
10 that requires both an interdiction and a judicial declaration of mental
54
incompetence before the right to vote can be denied.
Interdiction has remained procedurally unchanged for decades. Under
Louisiana Civil Code articles 389-426, 5" interdiction is a formal procedure
affecting a person's civil and property rights.5 6 An interdicted person is
a state ward and subject to court supervision. 7 Interdiction is a harsh
45. See, e.g., Melvin v. Sweeney, 154 Ohio 223, 94 N.E.2d 785 (1958). See also 29
C.J.S. Elections § 7(1) (1955).

46. 418 U.S. 24, 94 S.Ct. 2655 (1974).
47. Id. at 54-55, 94 S. Ct. at 2671.
48. Id.
49. See generally Annot., 80 A.L.R.3d 1116, 29 C.J.S. Elections § 7 (1955).
50. See, e.g., Boyd v. Board of Registrars of Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629 (Mass. 1975);
Lafayette v. Chippewa Falls, 70 Wis. 2d 610, 235 N.W.2d 435 (1975).
51. Hargrave, supra note 10, at 33.
52. Id.
53. Id. Interdiction may be imposed due to a physical handicap.
54. La. Const. art. 1, § 10.
55. La. Civ. Code arts. 389-426.
56. Vance v. Ellerbe, 150 La. 387, 90 So. 735 (1922).
57. Fuqua v. Fuqua, 311 So. 2d 568 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1975).
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remedy, one that is to be imposed only where proof is clear and
conclusive that an individual is unable to care for his person or property. 8
In 1981 the legislature added a form of limited interdiction governed
by the same procedures but with limited restrictions on civil and property
rights which fit the particular needs of the interdict.5 9 This addition
reduced some of the harshness of the former scheme.
Louisiana Revised Statutes 28:51-62 outline the procedure for judicially declaring a person mentally incompetent.60 The procedure allows
for the confinement of a person suffering from a mental illness which
will cause him to be a danger to himself and to others or to be gravely
6
disabled. 1
A 1976 Attorney General opinion62 declared that the right to vote
cannot be denied based solely on interdiction 3 or insanity.6" This double
requirement makes it rare for a person to be denied the right to vote
based on grounds of mental incompetence.
During the 1985 Louisiana Legislature's regular session a bill was
proposed, though never passed, that would have established a new form
of "limited interdiction. '65 It would have labelled as interdicted, for
the sole purpose of denying the right to vote, the mentally retarded or
disabled who were judicially declared incapable of voting. Contrasted
with the more complicated requirements for interdiction under Civil
Code article 389, 66 this proposed type of interdiction would have been
based solely on the ability to vote. The bill was designed to reduce the
difficulty in disfranchising mental incompetents.
However laudable the desired result, the legislation had severe constitutional infirmities and should serve as a warning to ill-conceived
legislation in the future. Because the right to vote is constitutionally
protected, and the constitution restricts the legislature's power, 67 only a
68
constitutional amendment can substantially impair the right to vote.
Any statutory attempt to do so is void. 69
Legislation such as this erodes the soundness of the constitution by
leaving it vulnerable to misinterpretation. The Constitutional Conven-

58.
59.

In re Adams, 209 So. 2d 363 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1968).
1981 La. Acts. No. 167 § I, adding La. Civ. Code art. 389.1.

60.

La. R.S. 28:51-62 (Supp. 1985).

61.
62.

La. R.S. 28:54 (Supp. 1985).
La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 76-1018 (July 30, 1976).

63. This conclusion was based on prior La. R.S. 18:42(4) (1969).
64. 1921 La. Const. of 1921.
65. H.R. Res. 307, Reg. Sess. (1985).
66. La. Civ. Code art. 389.
67. Hainkel v. Henry, 313 So. 2d 577 (La. 1975).
68. State ex rel. Palagi, 113 Mont. 343, 126 P.2d 818 (1942).
69. See, e.g., Melvin v. Sweeney, 154 Ohio 223, 94 N.E.2d 785 (1958). See also 29
C.J.S. Elections § 7(1) (1955).
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tion's overall objective was to reduce the constitution to a form that
would be clear and concise; this type of legislation defeats that purpose
by attempting to change the intent and purpose of the constitution,
creating ambiguities.

II. ELECTIONS
Article XI of the 1974 Constitution compiles five sections relating
to the election process. The Constitutional Convention "attempted to
constitutionalize basic, fundamental matters pertaining to the right to
vote; to make sure that the legislature could never change it. ' ' 70 Two
sections of article XI have had the greatest impact: section 1, the
constitutional mandate to provide an election code; and section 4, the
prohibition against the use of public funds.
Article XI, section 1
The legislature shall adopt an election code which shall provide
for permanent registration of voters and for the conduct of all
7t
elections.
In adopting an election code, the legislature eliminated former requirements relating to literacy, property, and lengthy residency. 72 An
elector is qualified solely by being a resident of the state. 73 Unlike
previously, there are no time requirements to qualify as a resident.
"Residence" has been liberally interpreted to mean where an individual
lives, sleeps, and eats. 74 Although a person may have only one domicile,
7
he may have several residences.
The residency requirement, along with the general registration requirement, is found in section 101 of the election code. 76 Citizens are
required to register to vote a short period of time before an election
so that a list of eligible voters can be prepared. This registration period
77
has a less restrictive effect than time requirements found in other states.
That a voter must be registered in order to exercise the right to vote"
makes registration, outside of article I, section 10, the only qualification
to vote.

70. Proceedings, Oct. 5, at 1638.
71. La. Const. art. Xl,§ i.
72. Hargrave, supra note 10.
73. La. R.S. 18:101 (1979 and Supp. 1986).
74. Staton v. Hutchinson, 370 So. 2d 106 (La. App. IstCir. 1978).
75. Turner v. Alexis, 436 So. 2d 1346 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1983).
76. La. R.S. 18:101 (1979 and Supp. 1986).
77. Burns v. Fortson, 410 U.S. 686, 93 S. Ct. 1209 (1973); Marston v. Lewis, 410
U.S. 679, 93 S. Ct. 1211 (1973).
78. La. R.S. 18:521 (Supp. 1986).
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Because article XI, section 1, encompasses "all elections," ' 79 local
government elections must be consistent with the state election code)'
In cases where the "Parish Charter is silent, the State Election Code
controls the holding and conduct of a parish-wide election.'", Each
parish police jury has the duty to establish and publish the location of
polling places for voting within its parish. 2 In addition to this duty,
the police jury may be exposed to liability to citizens who are injured
due to defective conditions of the locations selected. 8 3
Article XI, section 4
No public funds shall be used to urge any elector to vote for
or against any candidate or proposition, or be appropriated to
a candidate or political organization. This provision shall not
prohibit the use of public funds for dissemination of factual
information relative to a proposition appearing on an election
ballot.4
It is often questioned whether the information disseminated is purely
"factual," and therefore complies with this section, or "urges" a stand
on an issue, thus violating these provisions."5 "Urge" should be understood to mean promote, or take a favored position.' The first circuit
has held that the word "urge" does not render the provision vague or
uncertain . 7 "Factual information" relates to the use of all empirical
data required to decide whether to vote for or against an issue.8 8 The
provision relating to dissemination of factual information was designed
primarily to aid the public school system in raising money from tax
elections. Previously, the school system was unduly restricted from disseminating information.8 9 This provision allows the school system to
make available to the public all facts that show the need for funds.10
In Godwin v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Board, 9' however, a local
school board went beyond merely stating facts; it distributed brochures

79. La. Const. art. Xl, § 1.
80. La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 77-7 (Jan. 13, 1977).
81. Galan v. Parish Council, 419 So. 2d 141, 144 (La. App. 5th Cir. 1982).
82. Burgess v. City of Shreveport, 421 So. 2d 1141 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1982).
83. Id.
84. La. Const. art. Xl, § 4.
85. See La. Op. Att'y Gen. No. 79-1191 (Oct. 17, 1979).
86. Godwin v. East Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 372 So. 2d 1060 (La. App. Ist
Cir.), cert. denied, 373 So. 2d 527 (La. 1979).
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Proceedings, Oct. 9, at 1673.
90. Id.
91. 372 So. 2d 1060.
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supporting the proposal, conducted public opinion polls, and required
teachers to attend promotional sessions to urge the support of tax
proposals. The first circuit found that these actions avoided section 4.92
Godwin illustrates other principles which may be derived from this
section. One such principle is that, while this section does prohibit using
public funds to promote an issue, it does not preclude public officials
from doing so with their own money. 93 Further, included in the prohibition against the use of public funds are advertisements by a parish
using the name or picture of one of the members of the parish police
jury.9 4 Use of public funds without due care and reasonable diligence
and with reckless disregard is considered conduct in bad faith.95 Thus,
knowledge and reasonableness of the use of public funds are relevant
in determining whether the use is in good faith. A finding of bad faith
conduct may subject a public
official to liability for reimbursement of
96
funds to a public body.
One exception to the general prohibition disallowing the use of public
funds are student newspapers. 97 The Attorney General has ruled that
First Amendment rights attach to student newspapers and to the educational process in general.9 8 This opinion was based on Bazaar v.
Fortune," wherein the fifth circuit determined that, once a university
recognizes elements of free speech in a student activity, special circumstances must be present before the university can control the student
publication. Finding that funding for student newspapers was through
a number of sources including advertisements and was not only from
public funds, the Attorney General concluded that no special circumstances supported denying funding where the publication included political information."°°
In Reineke v. Cobb County School District, 0 ' a federal district court
in Georgia concluded that school officials could not deny funding to a
university publication if the denial amounted to a restraint of or substantial interference with that publication. The court required the school
officials to find financing for the publication which would allow it to
operate without the persistent threat of no funding." 2 The decision

92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

Id.
Id.
La.
372
Id.
La.
Id.
476
La.
484
Id.

at 1064.
at 1063.
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 75-589 (June 10, 1975).
So. 2d 1060.
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-1318 (Oct. 20, 1980).
F.2d 570 (5th Cir.), reh'g en banc, 489 F.2d 225 (5th Cir. 1973).
Op. Att'y Gen. No. 80-1318 (Oct. 20, 1980).
F. Supp. 1252 (N.D. Ga. 1980).
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parallels the position taken in Louisiana by the Attorney General that
regulations of this kind infringe on the free speech of student newspapers.
Conclusion
PART I

The Convention's attempt to clarify and simplify voting laws was
fairly successful. There has been almost no litigation over article I,
section 10 since the constitution was adopted. Nevertheless, the Convention did fail to clarify the definition of "order of imprisonment"
and left it open to misinterpretation. Originally, there was confusion as
to whether persons on parole and persons on probation were included
within the "order of imprisonment" terminology. The legislature's expansion of the definition to include persons whose sentences have been
suspended has added to the confusion. This expanded definition is not
only broader than that originally contemplated by the Convention, but
it also runs afoul of the specific language of article I, section 20, under
which all rights of citizenship are returned upon suspension of a sentence.
The proper course of action is to use the definition which makes voting
most accessible. That definition is the one which denies the right to
vote only to those persons who are actually in prison. Any change in
this definition should be left to a constitutional amendment.
Unlike the imprisonment terminology, there has been no debate
concerning persons denied the right to vote because of mental incompetence. The only concern is whether the provision is underinclusive by
allowing a person to vote who should be denied the right. The Convention struggled with this problem, but settled on a formula requiring
both an interdiction and a judicial declaration of incompetence before
the right to vote can be denied. As with the imprisonment language,
any change to the mental incompetence provisions should be by constitutional amendment.
PART II

Sections 2 through 5 of article XI represent the areas of election
law that the Convention wanted to be beyond statutory change. Since
those sections constitutionalized only certain well established ideas (secret
ballot, no proxy voting, and legislator's privilege from arrest while in
session), there has been little alteration or litigation in this area. The
section 4 prohibition against the use of public funds has produced the
greatest number of questions. However, if public bodies avoid taking
a stand on issues, they should encounter no problems with this provision.
Because section 1 is a mandate for legislation, it has produced few
constitutional questions. Nevertheless, it does provide a constitutional
cause of action for violations of an individual's right to vote.
Robert Stockstill

